People can be aware (conscious) or unaware (unconscious) of an active goal when making a choice. Being aware of a goal enables people to use conscious strategies to identify attributes that are relevant to goal pursuit and to assess the efficacy of the attributes of each choice alternative. For most people, this process encourages the choice of the most goal-consistent alternative. For some people, this process encourages the consideration of trade-offs, activates a competing goal, and encourages the choice of a goalinconsistent alternative. With unconscious goal pursuit, people cannot devote resources to assessing the efficacy of the attributes of each alternative; therefore, they match the accessible goal to the attributes of the available alternatives. As a result, the unconscious selects an alternative with attributes that are consistent with the goal and not necessarily the alternative that is most efficacious for the goal. The authors investigate these processes by manipulating the conscious system's ability to assess the efficacy of product attributes and the unconscious system's ability to match the accessible goal to product attributes.
Exploring the Differences Between Conscious and Unconscious Goal Pursuit
There has been extensive research into the interface between conscious and unconscious goal pursuit (Bargh 1990; Chartrand and Bargh 1996; Higgins 1989) . Most of this research has focused on identifying situations in which unconscious goal pursuit is as effective as conscious goal pursuit. It has been assumed that conscious and unconscious goal pursuit rely on common processes (Chartrand, Dalton, and Cheng 2008) , with unconscious goal pursuit being an automated version of conscious goal pursuit (Bargh 1989) . When the two types of goal pursuit have resulted in different outcomes, most researchers have concluded that there must be a cognitive bias in one type of goal pursuit. For example, conscious thought can encourage overcontemplation and an adjustment in attribute importance weights, which in turn can lead to a suboptimal choice (Levine, Halberstadt, and Goldstone 1996; Wilson and Schooler 1991) .
The present research demonstrates that differences between conscious and unconscious goal pursuit need not result from cognitive biases (Chartrand et al. 2010) . Instead, these differences can be a consequence of how the conscious and unconscious make a choice (Payne et al. 2008) . We explore how being (un)aware of a goal (e.g., buy healthy food) can influence a choice when (1) there are trade-offs among the available alternatives and (2) different alternatives can satisfy the goal to different degrees. We argue that conscious goal pursuit is characterized by a tendency to consider the trade-offs among alternatives, as defined by the goal. People consider these trade-offs because they are trying to map the attribute levels of the alternatives to the goal. For most people, this will encourage the selection of the alternative that is most consistent with the goal. For some people, this will increase the importance of the competing goal to such an extent that they will choose a goal-inconsistent alternative. In each case, conscious goal pursuit tends to result in a more extreme choice (i.e., either the most goalconsistent alternative or a goal-inconsistent alternative).
In contrast, unconscious goal pursuit does not use elaboration either to assess the relative merits of competing alternatives (i.e., the unconscious does not consider trade-offs) or to more precisely evaluate the efficacy of the attribute levels of each alternative with respect to the goal. Instead, the unconscious uses a matching process to identify alternatives that are acceptable given the goal. Consequently, an active goal will increase the likelihood that a goal-consistent option is chosen but will not necessarily determine which specific goal-consistent option is chosen.
Our conceptualization of conscious and unconscious goal pursuit enables us to hypothesize how goal accessibility and choice shares vary as a consequence of each type of goal pursuit. Conscious goal pursuit should be characterized by an increased accessibility of a focal goal and a competing goal, as well as a relatively more precise mapping of the alternatives to these goals. For this reason, choice shares should favor the alternative that is either most consistent with the goal or inconsistent with the goal. Unconscious goal pursuit should be characterized by increased accessibility of a focal goal, along with an identification of alternatives with attributes that can serve the goal. Consistent with these predictions, Study 1 shows that conscious (vs. unconscious) goal pursuit results in a higher choice share for the most goal-consistent alternative and the most goal-inconsistent alternative. In turn, unconscious goal pursuit results in a higher combined choice share for the goal-consistent alternatives, relative to conscious goal pursuit. Study 2 rules out competing processes (e.g., semantic activation) while providing additional evidence that the conscious and unconscious can pursue equivalent goals. Study 3 uses accessibility evidence to infer patterns of elaboration on goal-consistent and goal-inconsistent alternatives during conscious and unconscious goal pursuit. Study 4 shows that (1) increasing the attractiveness of the most goal-consistent alternative encourages choice during conscious, but not unconscious, goal pursuit and (2) increasing the number of attributes that match the active goal for goal-consistent options in general encourages choice during unconscious, but not conscious, goal pursuit. Study 5 shows that it is the consideration of trade-offs that enables conscious goal pursuit to occasionally promote selection of a goal-inconsistent alternative. Finally, Study 6 shows that the distinct processes of unconscious and conscious goal pursuit lead to different choice outcomes when multiple goals are active.
CONSCIOUS AND UNCONSCIOUS GOAL PURSUIT
There are several different conceptualizations of the relationship between conscious and unconscious thought. First, there are those that posit that conscious thought is more effective at making choices than unconscious thought (Keeney and Raiffa 1993; Locke 1995; Ryan 1970) . Conscious thought's participation in focusing attention, screening information, assessing trade-offs, logical reasoning, problem solving, implementing rules, behavioral monitoring, and planning is evidence for this claim. Second, there are those that posit that unconscious thought is as skilled at making choices as conscious thought (Bargh 1990; Chartrand, Dalton, and Cheng 2008) . Conscious and unconscious thought are equally adept at identifying goal-consistent alternatives (e.g., Chartrand, Dalton, and Cheng 2008) and making consistent choices as result of habits (Hommel 2000) . Third, some researchers posit that the unconscious is more skilled than the conscious at making choices. For example, Dijksterhuis and colleagues argue that unconscious decision making is more comprehensive (Dijksterhuis and Nordgren 2006) , integrative (Dijksterhuis et al. 2006) , and, consequently, representative of true preferences (Dijksterhuis 2004 ) than conscious decision making.
Although each of these positions has merit, we adopt a fourth position: the unconscious and conscious each have a different approach to making choices; thus, each is beneficial. We assess the difference in these approaches in the context of goal pursuit. More specifically, we focus on the choice of means (e.g., food) when a goal is active (e.g., eat healthy food) and the choice set consists of goal-consistent (e.g., healthy food) and goal-inconsistent alternatives.
Conscious Goal Pursuit and Choice
A defining feature of consciousness is that it can assess how well each option in a choice set contributes to the pursuit of a goal (Liberman and Chaiken 1991; Miller and Tesser 1986) . That is, consciousness makes it possible to improve the accuracy of a choice with respect to the goal (e.g., healthy food). A sufficiently motivated person can use a conscious process to (1) identify the attributes that are likely to satisfy the goal (e.g., sugar, fat, serving size), and (2) assess the degree to which the attribute level of any one alternative will satisfy the goal (Keeney and Raiffa 1993; Liberman and Chaiken 1991; Miller and Tesser 1986 ). Subsequently, consciousness can use elaboration to screen, organize, prioritize, and coordinate this information when making a choice (Bettman, Luce, and Payne 1998) .
There are two important consequences of the conscious identification and assessment of attributes with respect to an active goal. First, conscious goal pursuit should enable people to better differentiate the performance of alternatives with respect to a goal (i.e., define the goal-based merits of each option more precisely). People can recruit information from memory and/or elaborate on the information that defines an option to more accurately estimate the efficacy of the option (Keeney and Raiffa 1993) . Second, conscious goal pursuit can result in the consideration of attributes that can compete with the focal goal (e.g., "tasty" competes with "healthy"; Laran and Wilcox 2011) . The consideration of attributes or attribute levels that can compete with the focal goal should increase the accessibility of a goal (e.g., tasty) that opposes the focal goal (e.g., healthy). In combination, these consequences of conscious goal pursuit should enable people to more easily identify the alternative that is most consistent with the focal goal (e.g., healthy) as well as alternatives that are most consistent with a competing goal (e.g., tasty).
The identification and assessment of alternatives that are consistent with a competing goal will influence choice. The goal pursuit literature has shown that people search for balance across different goals (e.g., losing weight and enjoying indulgent foods; Dhar and Simonson 1999) . In most cases, pursuit of one goal involves an attempt to inhibit the competing goal (Förster and Liberman 2007) . Although inhibition of a competing goal is often successful (Brendl, Markman, and Messner 2003; Dalton and Spiller 2012; Shah, Friedman, and Kruglanski 2002) , it is not uniformly successful. For some people, the ability to identify alternatives associated with each goal, especially those that present trade-offs between different goals, makes it more difficult to inhibit the accessibility of competing goals (Dhar and Wertenbroch 2000; Ramanathan and Menon 2006) . To the extent that there is an increase in the accessibility of competing goals, the perceived importance and influence of these goals on choice should increase (Russo et al. 2008) .
Unconscious Goal Pursuit and Choice
A defining feature of unconscious goal pursuit is that there is no executive control system to actively prioritize or monitor goal pursuit (Laran 2010a; Laran and Janiszewski 2009) . The lack of an executive control system implies that the identification and assessment of the available alternatives, with respect to an active goal, will proceed differently than in conscious goal pursuit. This occurs because the unconscious, unlike the conscious, cannot allocate resources to more precisely assess the expected efficacy of an alternative with respect to a goal. Instead, the unconscious has to make a choice even though each alternative provides a range of potential performances with respect to a goal.
Previous research on unconscious goals and consumer choice can be used to hypothesize about the unconscious might choose among options. Because people cannot precisely assess the degree to which each alternative satisfies the focal and competing goals, the unconscious searches for attributes that match the active goal (Chartrand et al. 2008; Laran 2010b ). The unconscious then uses an "active goal-attributes of alternatives" matching process aimed at identifying alternatives that are consistent with the most accessible goal(s). A match between the active goal and the attributes increases the appeal of an alternative (Ferguson and Bargh 2004; Moore, Ferguson, and Chartrand 2011) .
There are two important consequences of the unconscious identification of attributes that match an active goal. First, unconscious goal pursuit should make it difficult to differentiate the performance of alternatives that are acceptable given the goal. Matching attributes to the active goal does not provide the precision needed to differentiate the alternatives. Second, unconscious goal pursuit should not activate goals that compete with the focal goal (Aarts and Dijksterhuis 2003; Chartrand et al. 2008; Laran, Janiszewski, and Cunha 2008) . Matching does not involve consideration of how alternatives with poorly performing attributes, with regard to the focal goal, can be efficacious in pursuing other goals. In combination, these consequences should enable people to easily identify alternatives that are consistent with the focal goal (e.g., to be healthy), but not the alternative that is most consistent with the goal.
CHOICE PATTERNS OF CONSCIOUS AND
UNCONSCIOUS GOAL PURSUIT Observing the hypothesized differences between conscious and unconscious goal pursuit requires a choice context that has (1) multiple alternatives that are consistent with the goal, so that unconscious goal pursuit can be shown to lack precision, and (2) alternatives featuring attributes that are positively and negatively correlated with the goal, so that conscious goal pursuit has an opportunity to activate the competing goal and select the alternative that is inconsistent with the goal.
To illustrate, consider a person who wants to eat healthy food and is deciding between a granola bar (the most goalconsistent alternative), SunChips (a goal-consistent/acceptable alternative), and potato chips (a goal-inconsistent alternative). When pursuing a goal consciously, people identify goalrelevant attributes and use these attributes to anticipate the performance of alternatives with respect to the goal. As a result, most people should choose a granola bar, with the remainder choosing the potato chips (owing to competing goal activation). When pursuing a goal unconsciously, people identify alternatives with attributes that are consistent with the goal (i.e., match). As a result, people should choose either a granola bar or SunChips because both match the "healthy" criterion. Thus, we predict that conscious goal pursuit will result in higher choice shares for the most goal-consistent alternative (granola bar) and a goal-inconsistent alternative (potato chips) relative to unconscious goal pursuit. Unconscious goal pursuit will result in a higher combined choice share for the goal-consistent alternatives (granola bar and SunChips) relative to conscious goal pursuit.
STUDY 1: CHOICE OF GOAL-CONSISTENT AND
GOAL-INCONSISTENT ALTERNATIVES Study 1 consciously or unconsciously instantiated the goal of "making a healthy choice." After the activation of the goal, participants were offered a choice set containing three options that were the most goal consistent, acceptable, or goal inconsistent, respectively. The goal-inconsistent option was acceptable for the competing goal (pleasurable eating).
We anticipated that participants in the conscious (vs. unconscious) goal pursuit condition would be more likely to the select the most goal-consistent alternative. Participants in the unconscious (vs. conscious) goal pursuit condition would be more likely to select any goal-consistent alternative (i.e., most goal-consistent + acceptable). In addition, we measured importance of the focal and competing goals. We expected that participants in the conscious goal condition would indicate a higher importance of the focal goal because they are aware of both the focal goal and the competing goal, owing to elaboration on goal-inconsistent alternatives.
Method
Participants and design. Participants were 229 (60.7% female; M age = 20 years) students who participated in exchange for course credit. This was the final sample after we removed 26 participants who did not follow instructions from the analysis. In this and all subsequent studies, participants were excluded when they failed an attention check (Oppenheimer, Meyvis, and Davidenko 2009) . The attention check consisted of a short paragraph at the top of a page that instructed participants not to answer two questions at the bottom of the page. Participants that did not answer the two questions passed the attention check. The design was a one-factor, between-subjects manipulation of goal instantiation (control, conscious, unconscious).
Procedure. The study involved two independent data collection periods. Preferences for the three choice alternatives were measured in a session at the beginning of the school semester. Goals were activated and choices were made in a session at the end of the semester. Responses were tracked over the two data collection periods using a lab identification number assigned at the beginning of the academic year.
During the first data collection period, participants were seated in individual carrels. Participants were told that the marketing department was thinking about awarding "thank you" food items to students who participated in future studies. Participants then viewed a set of three snacks: a granola bar, SunChips, and potato chips. We chose these snacks because previous lab studies had indicated that that these options were differentially associated with healthy eating. Participants were asked to rank the three alternatives from best to worst, given the goal "to be health-conscious and exert self-control." This ranking task was embedded in a 60-minute procedure administered to all members of the subject pool. The procedure collected preferences in two product categories as well as responses to 18 individual difference scales.
Three months later, during the second data collection period, participants were told that they would participate in two supposedly unrelated studies administered by computer. They were told that the first study would measure their attentional capabilities using a lexical decision task. In truth, the study administered the unconscious goal prime. Participants were seated in front of a computer monitor and asked to focus their attention on a fixation point (X). After a two-second delay, the fixation point was replaced by a letter string. Participants used a keyboard to indicate whether the letter string was a word (by pressing "9") or a nonword (by pressing "1"). After five practice trials, each participant completed a random series of 10 target words, 10 filler words, and 20 nonword trials. In the unconscious goal condition, the target words (e.g., "restrained," "temptations," "willpower") activated a healthy eating goal. In the control and conscious goal conditions, the target words were neutral (e.g., "comment," "off," "considers") so as not to activate a goal. For a detailed description of each study's stimuli and manipulations for this and subsequent studies, see the Web Appendix.
Participants were told that the second study was aimed at understanding people's preferences for snacks. The study solicited a choice from among the three snacks ranked in the first data collection period (i.e., granola bar, SunChips, and potato chips). In the control and unconscious conditions, participants were told to choose a snack to receive at the end of the experimental session (this was a real choice). In the conscious condition, participants were also told, "Try to be health-conscious and exert self-control when making this choice." Using experimental instructions to activate a conscious goal is common in goal research and in research comparing conscious with unconscious goal pursuit (Chartrand and Bargh 1996; Chartrand et al. 2010) .
The amount of time taken to make the choice was recorded to determine whether any differences emerged as a function of goal instantiation. After making their choice, participants were asked to indicate, "How important, for you, was the goal to be health-conscious?" and "How important, for you, was the goal to have pleasure with your eating?" when making the choice (1 = "least important," and 9 = "most important"). We used these items as measures of the importance of the focal and competing goals, respectively. Finally, participants answered a few demographic questions, were extensively debriefed for suspicion, were thanked for their time, and received their snack. No participants guessed the real purpose of the study, made a connection between the second data collection period and the measurement done at the beginning of the semester, or articulated how the priming task could have influenced their choice.
Results
First data collection period: baseline rankings. The expected pattern for the rankings of the three alternatives, in terms of their association with the goal of eating healthy, emerged. For the best alternative (i.e., most consistent with the goal), the majority of participants selected the granola bar (74.8%), with the next-highest share belonging to the SunChips (16.9%), and then the potato chips (8.3%). For the second-best alternative (i.e., acceptable given the goal), most participants selected the SunChips (70.1%), followed by the granola bar (16.6%) and potato chips (13.3%). Finally, for the worst alternative (i.e., inconsistent with the goal), potato chips had the highest share (78.4%), followed by SunChips (13.0%) and granola bar (8.6%). These results are consistent with two important assumptions. First, our sample generally perceived the granola bar and SunChips as goal-consistent alternatives and the potato chips as a goal-inconsistent alternative. Second, the majority of participants viewed the granola bar as the most goal-consistent alternative, the SunChips as an acceptable alternative given the goal, and the potato chips as a goal-inconsistent alternative.
Second data collection period: choices at the individual level. The first analysis examined choices of the most goalconsistent, acceptable, and goal-inconsistent alternatives. We determined these labels, which correspond to granola bar, SunChips, and potato chips, respectively, on the basis of the aggregate rankings in the first data collection period. There was an effect of goal instantiation condition on choices (c 2 (4) = 27.60, p < .01; see Table 1 ). In support of our predictions, participants in the conscious goal condition (64.9%) were more likely to choose the best alternative than participants in the control (38.0%; c 2 (1) = 11.55, p < .01) and unconscious goal (46.1%; c 2 (1) = 5.37, p < .05) conditions. However, participants in the unconscious goal condition (46.1% + 42.1% = 88.2%) were more likely to choose one of the acceptable alternatives as compared with the control (38.0% + 30.4% = 68.4%; c 2 (1) = 8.87, p < .01) and conscious goal (64.9% + 9.5% = 74.4%; c 2 (1) = 4.73, p < .05) conditions. The same test supports our predictions for the goal-inconsistent alternative, because participants in the conscious goal condition (25.6%) were more likely to choose the goal-inconsistent alternative than participants in the unconscious goal condition (11.8%).
In addition, we found a significant effect of the goal instantiation factor on the time taken to make a choice (F(2, 226) = 3.21, p < .05), measured in seconds. Participants in the conscious goal condition took longer in making their choice (M = 11.24, SD = 5.93) as compared with the control (M = 9.30, SD = 5.19; F(1, 226) = 4.68, p < .05) and unconscious goal (M = 9.40, SD = 4.75; F(1, 226) = 4.43, p < .05) conditions. These results suggest that participants in the conscious goal condition engaged in more elaboration.
Consistency across first and second data collection periods. The data obtained from the first and second data collection periods were used to confirm that people who believed that the granola bar was the most goal-consistent option were more likely to choose it in the conscious goal pursuit condition (see Appendix A). Participants who selected the granola bar as the most goal-consistent option in the first data collection period were more likely to choose it in the second period when they were in the conscious goal condition (81.1%) as compared with those in the control (42.4%; c 2 (1) = 17.58, p < .01) and unconscious goal (48.1%; c 2 (1) = 12.71, p < .01) conditions. This effect generalized to an analysis that used any top rank from the first data collection period (granola bar, SunChips, or potato chips). Participants in the conscious goal condition (75.7%; 43 + 6 + 7 = 56 out of 74 participants) were more likely to reselect their most goalconsistent option in the second period as compared with those in the control (41.8%; 25 + 5 + 3 = 33 out of 79 participants; c 2 (1) = 18.05, p < .01) and unconscious (46.1%; 26 + 5 + 4 = 35 out of 76 participants; c 2 (1) = 13.79, p < .01) conditions.
The data obtained from the first and second data collection periods were also used to confirm that people who believed the granola bar and SunChips were goal-consistent options were more likely to choose these options in the unconscious goal condition. Participants who selected the granola bar and SunChips as goal-consistent options in the first data collection period were more likely to choose one of these options in the second period when they were in the unconscious goal condition (93.5%) as compared with the control (77.2%; c 2 (1) = 6.49, p < .05) and conscious (78.9%; c 2 (1) = 5.44, p < .05) conditions. This effect did not generalize to an analysis that used any top-two ranked options from the first data collection period. Participants in the unconscious condition (85.5%) were not more likely to reselect one of their top two options from the first data collection period as compared with the control (81.0%; c 2 (1) = .57, p > .05) and conscious (81.1%; c 2 (1) = .53, p > .05) conditions. This failure to generalize the results to any top two options is a consequence of participants ranking potato chips as more consistent with a healthy eating goal than a granola bar or SunChips, a claim that is more likely to represent response error than a true alternativeto-goal mapping.
Second data collection period: goal importance. An analysis of the importance of the focal goal revealed an effect of goal instantiation (F(2, 226) = 8.23, p < .01). Participants in the conscious goal condition indicated that being health conscious while making their choice was more important (M = 7.28, SD = 1.88) as compared with participants in the control (M = 5.87, SD = 2.42; F(1, 226) = 16.08, p < .01) and unconscious (M = 6.22, SD = 2.33; F(1, 226) = 9.36, p < .01) conditions. These results are consistent with the idea that participants in the conscious goal condition were aware that the goal was active.
An analysis of the importance of the competing goal also revealed an effect of the goal instantiation factor (F(2, 226) = 3.09, p < .05). Participants in the conscious goal condition indicated that seeking pleasure was more important when making their choice (M = 6.43, SD = 2.20) as compared with participants in the control (M = 5.76, SD = 1.95; F(1, 226) = 4.03, p < .05) and unconscious goal (M = 5.67, SD = 2.01; F(1, 226) = 4.91, p < .05) conditions. These results indicate that although participants in the conscious goal condition were focused on the focal goal (i.e., health consciousness), they also considered the competing goal (i.e., eating for pleasure).
Ancillary Study
We conducted an additional study to provide evidence for two of our claims: (1) the effects of the conscious and unconscious manipulations are a result of goal priming as opposed to semantic priming and (2) the goal manipulations (conscious vs. unconscious) result in similar levels of goal activation. First, if the results are driven by goal priming, one way to verify this would be to observe the effects of the manipulations on goal accessibility after a delay, because research has shown that temporal escalation is a unique property of goal activation (i.e., the goal should be more accessible after a delay; Bargh et al. 2001; Fitzsimons, Chartrand, and Fitzsimons 2008) . Second, to the extent that the conscious and unconscious goal conditions result in similar levels of accessibility, before and after a delay, we can conclude that one type of goal pursuit is not more/less active than the other.
Participants and procedure. Participants were 255 members of an online panel (Amazon Mechanical Turk [MTurk]; 49% female; M age = 35.49 years). This was the final sample after removing 16 participants for failing the attention check discussed previously. The study used a 2 (delay: no delay, delay) × 3 (goal instantiation: control, conscious, unconscious) between-subjects design. The first part of the study contained the same goal instantiation manipulations from Study 1. After the priming task, participants in the delay condition were told that they would take part in an unrelated second study, which was supposedly geared toward understanding common words used while writing (Laran, Janiszewski, and Cunha 2008) . Participants were told that they would be given five minutes to write down words that had the letter "e" in the middle, after which they would automatically be forwarded to the next study. Participants in the no-delay condition did not perform this task. All participants were then shown the same snacks from Study 1 but did not make a choice, as making a goal-related choice could decrease the accessibility of the goal because of goal achievement. Instead, participants were told to take a moment to "think about what you would choose if you were in this situation."
Participants then moved to a final study. They were told that they would view various word fragments (e.g., "w_r_") and would need to fill in the missing spaces to create a meaningful word (e.g., "word" or "warp"). Such word completions tasks are an effective measure of goal accessibility (Malaviya and Sternthal 2009 ). There were six words in total, with half of the words representing neutral constructs (e.g., "major," "picture," "clock"). However, three word fragments ("_ealth_," "sli_," and "_ _esh") had the potential to be related ("healthy," "slim," "fresh") or unrelated ("wealthy," "slip," "flesh") to the healthy eating goal. The dependent measure was the total number of healthy eating words formed.
Results. An analysis of variance on the number of healthy eating words revealed an interaction between the delay and goal instantiation factors (F(2, 249) = 3.77, p < .05). In the no-delay condition, as compared with the control condition (M = 1.45, SD = .62), the healthy eating goal was more accessible for participants in the conscious (M = 1.79, SD = .78; F(1, 249) = 5.13, p < .05) and unconscious (M = 1.72, SD = .71; F(1, 249) = 4.03, p < .05) goal conditions. In the delay condition, as compared with the control condition (M = 1.37, SD = .77), the healthy eating goal was also more accessible for participants in the conscious (M = 2.13, SD = .76; F(1, 249) = 21.79, p < .01) and unconscious goal (M = 2.24, SD = .80; F(1, 249) = 24.56, p < .01) conditions. In support of a goal-priming account, the accessibility of the healthy eating goal became greater in the delay condition, as compared with the no-delay condition, within the conscious goal (M no delay = 1.79, SD = .78 vs. M delay = 2.13, SD = .76; F(1, 249) = 4.50, p < .05) and unconscious goal (M no delay = 1.72, SD = .71 vs. M delay = 2.24, SD = .80; F(1, 249) = 10.33, p < .01) conditions, but not in the control condition (M no delay = 1.45, SD = .62 vs. M delay = 1.37, SD = .77; F < 1). The healthy eating goal did not differ in accessibility when comparing the conscious and unconscious goal conditions within the no-delay or delay conditions (both Fs < 1).
Discussion
The results of Study 1 demonstrate the differences between conscious and unconscious goal pursuit. Conscious (vs. unconscious) goal pursuit resulted in a greater choice share of the most goal-consistent alternative, presumably because of the conscious ability to elaborate on the efficacy of the attributes of each option. This ability, however, also led to a greater choice share of the goal-inconsistent alternative. An ancillary study demonstrated that the goal instantiation procedures we used were indeed activating a goal, and not a semantic concept, because the goal became more accessible after a delay. We explore this idea further in the next study.
STUDY 2: CHOICE EVIDENCE FOR GOAL PURSUIT
VERSUS SEMANTIC PRIMING Although an ancillary study to Study 1 demonstrated that the goals increased in accessibility after a delay, it was important to provide choice evidence that our manipulations were priming goals and not semantic information (i.e., healthy vs. pleasurable eating). To address this issue, we made use of another documented difference between goal primes and semantic primes. According to Förster, Liberman, and Friedman (2009) , goal primes are only effective when they are associated with valuable outcomes, whereas semantic primes are effective regardless of outcome associations. Thus, Study 2 manipulates the value of the outcome associated with the primes to be high (i.e., positive) or low (i.e., negative). When the value of the outcome is high, we should obtain the results obtained in Study 1, which are also consistent with semantic priming. When the value of the outcome is low, however, goal and semantic priming predict different results. People do not pursue goals that have low value; therefore, there should not be differences in choice shares among the alternatives (i.e., goal pursuit should not occur). If semantic information is being primed, associating the information with a low, negative value should result in higher choice shares for the goal-inconsistent relative to the goal-consistent alternatives. Therefore, semantic information should be accessible independent of the associated value but should influence choice differently in line with the associated value. Goals should not be accessible when associated with a low value, and therefore they should not influence choices.
Method
Participants and design. Participants were 493 students (53.1% female; M age = 20 years) who participated in exchange for course credit. This was the final sample after removing 58 participants using the exclusion criteria discussed in Study 1. The design was a 2 (goal instantiation: conscious, unconscious) × 2 (goal value: low, high) betweensubjects design, plus a control condition.
Stimuli. The choice set consisted of six bonsai trees that were negatively correlated with respect to a focal goal (product ease of use) and a competing goal (product aesthetics). Each bonsai tree had its own picture, to vary aesthetic appeal, and a "caretaking meter" that represented the relative ease of caring for the tree (0 = "easy care," and 10 = "difficult care"; see Appendix B). Instead of examining preference consistency across two time periods, as in Study 1, we conducted a pretest (n = 60) that confirmed that the choice set had the required characteristics. Participants ranked the alternatives from best to worst on the goals "to have an easy-to-use product" (focal goal) and "to have an aesthetically pleasing product" (competing goal). The pretest confirmed that trees A and B were the two best alternatives on the focal goal, as they were ranked the best (83.3%) and second best (80.0%) the most often. There were also two acceptable alternatives on the focal goal, with trees C and D ranked the third (81.6%) and fourth (80.0%) best the most often. Trees E and F were considered the two goal-inconsistent alternatives, being ranked the fifth (88.3%) and worst (90.0%) the most often. However, trees E and F were also considered more aesthetically pleasing, with the pair being ranked the best (86.7%) and second best (78.3%) the most often, while trees C and D were ranked the third best (78.3%) and fourth best (60.0%), and trees A and B ranked fifth best (73.3%) and worst (85.0%) the most often.
Procedure. The procedure consisted of two studies in the goal-instantiation conditions and a single study (the second of the two studies) in the control condition (see the Web Appendix). The goal instantiation and goal value manipulations were administered concurrently. Thus, the conscious and unconscious goal participants completed different versions of the first study.
In the unconscious goal condition, participants were told that the first study would measure their attentional capabilities using a lexical decision task. The procedure was similar to the unconscious goal priming procedure used in Study 1, but with three important modifications. First, the total number of trials was 50. Twenty of the trials contained nonwords, 10 of the trials contained neutral words, and 20 target trials contained the priming words. Second, the target trials were used to concurrently prime the focal goal (ease of use) and goal value (high vs. low). Participants initially saw a priming word related to the focal goal (e.g., "easy," "intuitive") and then a second priming word that reflected goal value. The goal value words differed by condition. In the low-value condition, participants were shown words such as "worthless" and "bad." In the high-value condition, participants were shown words such as "worthwhile" and "good." Third, the order in which the trials were presented was no longer randomized-a goal prime was always followed by a value prime. This method was adapted from Custers and Aarts (2005) and Aarts, Custers, and Holland (2007) . After completing this task, participants moved on to the second study.
In the conscious goal condition, the first study was titled "Understanding Scientific Research," adapted from McFerran and Mukhopadhyay (2013) . Participants were told that the purpose of the study was to gauge students' ability to understand and apply research findings in their everyday lives. They proceeded to read an abstract that supposedly came from a published scientific journal article. Parts of the abstract differed depending on the goal value condition. In the low-value condition, participants read that "consumers who were the least satisfied in their product experience placed too much emphasis on having an easy-touse product." In the high-value condition, participants read that "consumers who were the most satisfied in their product experience placed a great deal of emphasis on having an easy-to-use product." The expectation was that this information would change the relative value of the goal. After reading the abstract, participants answered a multiple-choice question asking them to summarize the main finding from the research. After providing a response, they moved on to the second study.
All participants completed the second study (see the Web Appendix). Participants were asked to imagine that they were in the market for a bonsai tree. They saw six different bonsai trees with the screen location randomized. Participants in the conscious goal condition were told to "try to apply what you learned from the previous research to your actual choice." Participants in the unconscious goal and control conditions were not given this instruction. Participants then made a choice. The time taken to make the choice was recorded.
After making a choice, participants were asked to indicate the extent to they agreed (1 = "strongly disagree," and 9 = "strongly agree") that "the goal to select something that was not too hard to take care of" was important during their choice (focal goal). Participants were also asked to indicate the extent to which they agreed that the "only goal I cared about was the look of the tree" while making their choice (competing goal). Participants then answered demographic questions and were extensively debriefed for suspicion.
Results
Choices. The first analysis focused on the percentage of participants who selected one of the best alternatives. There was a goal instantiation × goal value interaction on choices of the most goal-consistent alternatives (c 2 (1) = 3.89, p < .05; see Table 1 ). In the high-goal-value condition, participants in the conscious condition (31.4% + 29.4% = 60.8%) were more likely to choose one of the goalconsistent alternatives than participants in the control (14.1% + 18.2% = 32.3%; c 2 (1) = 16.35, p < .01) and unconscious (22.4% + 19.4% = 41.8%; c 2 (1) = 7.18, p < .01) conditions. These results replicated the results of Study 1. However, in the low-goal-value condition, participants in the conscious condition were as likely to choose one of the goalconsistent alternatives (12.2% + 15.3% = 27.5%) as participants in the control (14.1% + 18.2% = 32.3%; c 2 (1) = .54, p > .45) and unconscious (11.5% + 17.7% = 29.2%; c 2 (1) = .06, p > .45) conditions.
The second analysis focused on the percentage of participants who selected one of the goal-consistent, acceptable alternatives. There was a goal instantiation × goal value interaction on choices of the goal-consistent alternatives (c 2 (1) = 3.85, p = .05; see Table 1 ). In the highgoal-value condition, participants in the unconscious condition (22.4% + 19.4% + 19.4% + 26.5% = 87.7%) were more likely to choose one of the goal-consistent alternatives than participants in the control (14.1% + 18.2% + 12.1% + 17.2% = 61.6%; c 2 (1) = 17.77, p < .01) and conscious (31.4% + 29.4% + 5.9% + 9.8% = 76.5%; c 2 (1) = 4.31, p < .05) conditions. The same test supports our predictions regarding goal-inconsistent alternatives because participants in the conscious condition were more likely to choose one of these alternatives (15.7% + 7.8% = 23.5%) than participants in the unconscious condition (7.1% + 5.2% = 12.3%). However, in the low-goal-value condition, participants in the unconscious goal condition (11.5% + 17.7% + 16.7% + 14.6% = 60.5%) were as likely to choose one of these alternatives as participants in the control (14.1% + 18.2% + 12.1% + 17.2% = 61.6%; c 2 (1) = .03, p > 45) and conscious (12.2% + 15.3% + 14.3% + 22.4% = 64.2%; c 2 (1) = .31, p > .45) conditions. In contrast to Study 1, we failed to find a significant effect on time taken to make a choice (F < 1). This may be explained by the amount of visual information available about the alternatives, which may have triggered other types of processing in addition to the goals and added noise to this measure.
Goal importance. As we expected, an analysis of the focal goal item revealed that, in the high-goal-value condition, participants in the conscious condition indicated that selecting an easy-to-use product was more important (M = 6.64, SD = 2.20) compared with participants in the control (M = 5.73, SD = 2.54; F(1, 488) = 7.38, p < .01) and unconscious (M = 5.59, SD = 2.37; F(1, 488) = 10.47, p < .01) conditions. However, in the low-goal-value condition, participants in the conscious condition did not indicate an increased importance (M = 5.43, SD = 2.55) compared with the control (M = 5.73, SD = 2.54; F(1, 488) = .68, p > .40) and unconscious (M = 5.65, SD = 2.72; F(1, 488) = .33, p > .40) conditions. Also as we expected, an analysis of the competing goal item revealed that, in the high-goal-value condition, participants in the conscious condition indicated that selecting an aesthetically pleasing product was more important (M = 5.88, SD = 2.14) compared with participants in the control (M = 5.19, SD = 2.07; F(1, 488) = 5.37, p < .05) and unconscious (M = 5.14, SD = 1.97; F(1, 488) = 6.39, p = .01) conditions. However, in the low-goal-value condition, participants in the conscious condition did not show an increased importance of an aesthetically pleasing product (M = 5.34, SD = 1.99) compared with the control (M = 5.19, SD = 2.07; F(1, 488) = .25, p > .60) and unconscious (M = 5.01, SD = 2.16; F(1, 488) = 1.20, p > .25) conditions.
Discussion
Study 2 demonstrates that the patterns of choices obtained in Study 1 were a result of goal priming, not semantic priming. People pursued goals only to the extent that these goals were associated with valued outcomes. If the results were a consequence of semantic priming, associating different values with the primes should not have decreased the accessibility of the semantic information while still influencing choices. Indeed, associating the semantic information with low value could have increased the choices of goal-inconsistent alternatives.
The results also rule out an alternative explanation based on reactance. One could argue that participants who were consciously pursuing a goal were more likely to choose goal-inconsistent alternatives because they were reacting against the instruction to pursue a certain goal. If that were the case, they should also have reacted against the instruction not to pursue a goal (low-value condition) and increased goal pursuit.
STUDY 3: ACCESSIBILITY EVIDENCE AS A PROXY FOR
ELABORATION Thus far, we have not provided evidence that the results are due to different patterns of elaboration between conscious and unconscious goal pursuit, especially with regard to goal-inconsistent alternatives. Study 3 follows the same procedure as that of Study 2, but measures goal accessibility. When the goal is associated with high value, we expect that the focal goal will be highly accessible in the conscious and unconscious condition, because the goal is primed in both conditions. Importantly, we expect that the competing goal will be more accessible in the conscious (vs. unconscious) goal condition, because participants in this condition should elaborate on goal-inconsistent alternatives, which should increase the accessibility of the competing goal. When the goal is associated with low value, we do not expect any difference across conditions. That is, when the focal goal has a low value, focal goal pursuit should not be initiated. When there is no active focal goal, there is no need to elaborate on the importance of a competing goal.
Method
Participants and design. Participants were 189 students (53.1% female; M age = 20 years) who participated in exchange for course credit. This was the final sample size after removing 17 participants for failing the attention check. The design was a 2 (goal instantiation: conscious, unconscious) × 2 (goal value: low, high) between-subjects design, plus a control condition.
Procedure. The procedure was identical to Study 2, with two important modifications. First, participants did not make a choice, because making a goal-related choice could decrease the accessibility of the goal owing to goal achievement. After the unconscious and conscious goal instantiation manipulation, participants viewed the choice set and were told to take a moment to "think about what you would choose if you were in this situation." Second, after viewing the choice set, participants moved on to a different study stating that they would view various word fragments (e.g., "w_r_"), following the same procedure as that of the ancillary study (described in Study 1). There were 12 words in total, with half of the words representing neutral constructs (e.g., "chalk," "clock," "window"). However, three word fragments ("_imple," "_ase," and "clea_") had the potential to be related ("simple," "ease," "clear") or unrelated ("dimple," "vase," "cleat") to the ease-of-use goal. In addition, three word fragments ("be_ _ _y," "gl _ _ _ r," and "_ _su _l") had the potential to be related ("beauty," "glamor," "visual") or unrelated ("betray," "glider," "casual") to the aesthetics goal. The dependent measures were the total number of ease-of-use-related and aesthetics-related words formed.
Results
There was an effect of the goal-instantiation condition on the number of words related to the focal goal, ease of use (F(4, 184) = 4.97, p < .01). In the high-goal-value, conscious condition, the ease-of-use goal was more accessible (M = 1.71, SD = .67) than in the control condition (M = 1.38, SD = .68; F(1, 184) = 4.13, p < .05), low-goal-value, conscious goal condition (M = 1.31, SD = .66; F(1, 184) = 6.52, p = .01), and low-goal-value, unconscious goal condition (M = 1.22, SD = .65; F(1, 184) = 10.00, p < .01). Similarly, in the high-goal-value, unconscious condition, the ease-of-use goal was also more accessible (M = 1.76, SD = .71) than in the control condition (F(1, 184) = 5.70, p < .05), low-goal-value, conscious goal condition (F(1, 184) = 8.51, p < .01), and low-goal-value, unconscious goal condition (F(1, 184) = 12.50, p < .01). Importantly, within the high-goalvalue condition, the ease-of-use goal did not differ in accessibility when comparing the conscious and unconscious goal conditions (F < 1). These results show that the focal goal was equally accessible in the conscious and unconscious goal conditions when the goal value was high.
There was also an effect of goal-instantiation condition on the number of aesthetics-related words formed (F(4, 184) = 4.73, p < .01). In the high-goal-value, conscious goal condition, the aesthetics goal was more accessible (M = 1.03, SD = .52) than in the control condition (M = .70, SD = .66; F(1, 184) = 5.28, p < .05), low-goal-value, conscious goal condition (M = .72, SD = .69; F(1, 184) = 4.66, p < .01), and low-goal-value, unconscious goal condition (M = .68, SD = .68; F(1, 184) = 5.85, p < .05). In contrast, in the high-goal-value, unconscious goal condition, the aesthetics goal was less accessible (M = .39, SD = .50) than in the control condition (F(1, 184) = 5.23, p < 05), low-goal-value, conscious goal condition (F(1, 184) = 5.59, p < .05), and low-goal-value, unconscious goal condition (F(1, 184) = 4.51, p < .05). These results show that when goal value was high, the accessibility of the competing goal was more accessible in the conscious goal condition but was inhibited in the unconscious goal condition.
Discussion
Study 3 provides additional support for differences between conscious and unconscious goal pursuit. Conscious goal pursuit made a competing goal more accessible, which suggests that participants were elaborating more on the goal-inconsistent alternatives. Goal accessibility was not influenced when the outcomes associated with a focal goal were not valued.
STUDY 4: INCREASING THE AMOUNT OF MATCHING
ATTRIBUTES In Study 4, we examine the processes that are hypothesized to differentiate conscious and unconscious goal pursuit by changing the composition of the choice set. Participants made a choice from a set featuring three alternatives, all consistent with the goal. In a baseline condition, one alternative was the most goal consistent and two were acceptable. In a second condition, the most goalconsistent alternative was improved by increasing the value of the attribute most consistent with the goal, and the other two alternatives were improved by adding more goalconsistent attributes. We predict that improving the most goal-consistent alternative will increase the choice shares of this alternative for conscious, but not unconscious, goal pursuit. Conscious goal pursuit is sensitive to relative levels of performance on goal-relevant attributes. We also predict that improving acceptable alternatives will increase choice shares of these alternatives for unconscious, but not conscious, goal pursuit. Unconscious goal pursuit matches the accessible goal to attributes of the alternatives that are consistent with the goal.
Method
Participants and design. Participants were 275 members of an online panel (MTurk; 39% female; M age = 33.23 years). This was the final sample after removing five participants for failing the attention check. The design was a 2 (attribute set: baseline, improved) × 2 (goal instantiation: conscious, unconscious) between-subjects design.
Procedure. The procedure comprised two supposedly unrelated studies. The first study used the lexical decision task detailed in Study 1 to administer the unconscious goal prime. The only difference was that the goal was changed to socializing with others, which meant that the target words were changed accordingly (e.g., "social," "talk," "friends").
In the second study, participants were asked to view a set of cooking classes and indicate which they would prefer to attend. The instructions stated that each class had been rated on a set of attributes using a 1 to 10 scale in which 1 (10) equaled a low (high) score. For participants in the conscious goal condition, they were additionally instructed, "When making this choice, try to select a class that will allow you to socialize with others." Participants then viewed a set of three cooking classes and made a choice. In contrast to the previous studies, every alternative in the choice set was consistent with the focal goal of socializing, thereby eliminating the presence of a competing goal. However, the amount of attribute information that accompanied each of the three cooking classes, and the ratings assigned to each attribute, varied by condition (see Appendix B).
Participants in the baseline attribute set condition always saw the three classes that were described by three attributes. For participants in the improved attribute set condition, the number of attributes was increased to five. There were five possible attributes that could be displayed ("diversity of attendees," "appropriateness of class size," "enjoyment of class length," "quality of team tasks," and "rating of postcompletion reunion events"). The specific attributes were randomly selected for each condition, and the order of the attributes within each cooking class, as well as the order in each the three options were presented, was randomized. In the baseline attribute set condition, cooking class A was the best alternative, with the first attribute having a high rating (7) and the second and third attributes having belowaverage ratings (4). Cooking classes B and C were both acceptable alternatives, with the first attribute having a low rating (1) but the second and third attributes having moderate ratings (5 and 6, respectively). In the improved attribute set condition, participants were shown the same ratings within each class for the first three attributes, with the lone exception being that the first attribute for class A was changed to a higher rating (increased from 7 to 9). In addition, cooking class A was assigned fourth and fifth attributes with moderate ratings (5 and 5), while cooking classes B and C were given slightly better ratings (5 and 6). Thus, the choice set was constructed in such a way that the most goal-consistent alternative always had a strong rating for one attribute but relatively weaker ratings for the remaining attributes, while the remaining alternatives had a weak rating for one attribute but relatively stronger ratings for the remaining attributes.
After making a choice, participants were asked to indicate the importance of the goal to "pick a class that allowed you to socialize with others" (1 = "not at all important," and 9 = "very important"). Participants then answered a few demographic questions before being debriefed and thanked for their time.
Pretest. Two pretests confirmed that the baseline attribute set and the improved attribute set had choice sets with the required characteristics. In one condition, participants (n = 42) were shown the baseline attribute set and then ranked the three alternatives, from best to worst, for the goal "to socialize with others" (focal goal). Cooking class A was ranked the best (73.8%), while classes B and C were ranked the second best (B = 45.2% + C = 38.1% = 83.3%) and third best (B = 40.5% + C = 50.0% = 90.5%) most often, interchangeably. In a second condition, participants (n = 38) were shown the improved attribute set. Consistent with the results of the baseline attribute set, cooking class A was ranked the best (81.6%), while classes B and C were ranked the second best (B = 42.1% + C = 50.0% = 92.1%) and third best (B = 42.1%, C = 47.4% = 89.5%) most often, interchangeably.
Results
Choices. Given that all alternatives were consistent with the goal, we focus on analyzing the choice of the most goal-consistent alternative versus the other two alternatives. There was a goal instantiation × attribute set interaction on choice of the most goal-consistent alternative (c 2 (1) = 8.81, p < .01; see Table 1 ). In the baseline attribute set condition, participants in the conscious condition (58.1%) were more likely to choose the most goal-consistent alternative than participants in the unconscious condition (36.8%; c 2 (1) = 6.18, p = .01). The same test shows that participants in the unconscious condition were more likely to select one of the acceptable alternatives (32.9 + 30.3 = 63.2%) as compared with the conscious condition (19.4% + 22.5% = 41.9%). The interaction was driven by the finding that, in the conscious condition, participants in the improved attribute set condition became even more likely to choose the most goal-consistent alternative (76.6% vs. 58.1%; c 2 (1) = 5.47, p < .05), while those in the unconscious goal condition became less likely to do so (21.7% vs. 36.8%; c 2 (1) = 3.67, p < .05). The same test shows that participants in the unconscious condition were more likely to select one of the other two alternatives in the improved attribute set (36.7 + 41.6 = 78.3%) as compared with the baseline attribute set condition (32.9% + 30.3% = 63.2%; c 2 (1) = 3.67, p < .05).
Goal importance. As we expected, an analysis of the focal goal item revealed only a significant effect of goal instantiation (F(1, 271) = 30.05, p < .01). Participants in the conscious condition indicated that the ability to socialize was more important (M = 6.92, SD = 2.32) as compared with participants in the unconscious condition (M = 5.36, SD = 2.34).
Discussion
Study 4 provides additional insight into the characteristics of conscious and unconscious goal pursuit. Improving the most goal-consistent alternative in a set increased choice of this alternative during conscious goal pursuit. Adding more goal-consistent attributes to the other alternatives increased choice of these alternatives during unconscious goal pursuit. These results show that unconscious goal pursuit is sensitive to an increase in the number of attributes that are consistent with the goal, whereas conscious goal pursuit is sensitive to improvements in the most goal-consistent alternative in a set. The next study examines how the presence of trade-offs influence conscious and unconscious goal pursuit.
STUDY 5: ELIMINATING A COMPETING GOAL
We posit that conscious goal pursuit chooses goalinconsistent options when the consideration of alternatives associated with a competing goal leads to an increase in the importance of the competing goal. If this is so, then offering goal-inconsistent alternatives that do not compete with the focal goal should allow for the uncontested choice of the most goal-consistent alternative. To test this prediction, we had participants choose a fun restaurant. In one condition, some options were described as fun and others were described as formal (i.e., competing goals). In this case, we expected to replicate the previous results. In a second condition, some options were described as fun and others were described as offering large portions (i.e., uncorrelated goals). A fun goal should not encourage people to elaborate on the importance of having large portions, because this goal does not compete with the fun goal.
Method
Participants and design. Participants were 354 students (47.7% female; M age = 24.56 years) who participated in exchange for course credit. This was the final analysis sample that resulted from the removal of 54 participants for failing the attention check. The design was a 2 (goal instantiation: conscious, unconscious) × 2 (options associated with a competing goal: present, absent) betweensubjects design.
Procedure. The procedure consisted of two ostensibly unrelated studies. The first study used the lexical decision task detailed in Study 1 to administer the unconscious goal prime. The only difference was that the goal was changed to having fun, which meant that the target words were changed accordingly (e.g., "fun," "lively," "enjoyable"). The target words in the conscious goal condition were neutral words so as not to activate a goal.
In the second study, participants were asked to choose a restaurant they would prefer to visit. In the conscious goal condition, participants were given extra instructions, "When making this choice, try to have fun and do something exciting." Participants then viewed a set of four restaurants and made a choice. The restaurants that each participant saw differed by condition (see Appendix B). In the competing-goal-present condition, participants saw two restaurants that were consistent with the focal goal of fun dining, with restaurant A being the best alternative and restaurant B being an acceptable alternative. Restaurants C and D were not consistent with the focal goal of fun dining but were consistent with the competing goal of fine dining. In the competing-goal-absent condition, participants also saw restaurants A and B. However, the two remaining alternatives were changed to restaurants E and F, which were not consistent with the competing goal of fine dining but were consistent with a noncompeting goal of having large portions. Thus, the difference in each choice set was whether the focal-goal-consistent alternatives were coupled with competing goal or noncompeting goal alternatives.
After making their choice, participants were asked to indicate the importance of the goal to "pick a restaurant that was really spirited," "pick a restaurant that was really fine," and "pick a restaurant that had really large portions" during their choice (1 = "least important," and 9 = "most important"). These items served as the measure of the importance of the focal goal, competing goal, and noncompeting goal, respectively.
Pretest. We ran two pretests. The first pretest confirmed that the choice alternatives had a proper structure. In one condition, participants (n = 45) ranked the relevant alternatives (i.e., fun and fine options) from best to worst for the goals to pick a fun restaurant (focal goal) and pick a formal restaurant (competing goal). With respect to a fun restaurant, restaurant A was ranked the best (75.6%), restaurant B the second best (51.1%), and restaurants C and D were the third best (71.1%) or worst (71.1%) most often. With respect to a formal restaurant, restaurants C and D were ranked the best (97.7%) or the second best (97.7%), and restaurants A and B were ranked the third best (97.8%) or worst (97.8%) most often. In a second condition (n = 38), participants ranked the relevant alternatives (i.e., fun and big portion options) from best to worst for the goals to pick a fun restaurant (focal goal) and pick a largeportioned restaurant (noncompeting goal). With respect to a fun restaurant, restaurant A was ranked the best (76.3%), restaurant B the second best (60.5%), and restaurants E and F were the third best (78.9%) or worst (84.2%) most often. With respect to a large-portioned restaurant, restaurants E and F were ranked the best (92.1%) or the second best (86.8%), and restaurants A and B were ranked the third best (86.8%) or worst (92.1%) most often.
A second pretest (n = 23) confirmed that the focal goal (M = 5.10, SD = 1.51), competing goal (M = 5.16, SD = 1.53), and noncompeting goal (M = 4.96, SD = 1.17) did not differ in terms of importance at baseline (F < 1). Participants were also asked, for each possible pair of focal, competing, and noncompeting goals, the extent to which they complemented or competed with each other (1 = "compete with each other," 5 = "neither compete with nor complement each other," and 9 = "complement each other"). Means were compared with the midpoint. When the focal and competing goals were paired, participants indicated that the goals competed with each other (M = 3.83, SD = 2.23; t(22) = −2.53, p < .05). However, when the focal and noncompeting goals were paired, participants indicated that the goals neither complemented nor competed with each other (M = 5.57, SD = 1.70; t(22) = 1.59, p > .10).
Results
Choices. The first analysis focused on the competinggoal-present condition. There was an effect of the goal instantiation condition on choice (c 2 (3) = 22.61, p < .01; see Table 1 ). Participants in the conscious condition (54.9%) were more likely to choose the most goal-consistent alternative than participants in the unconscious condition (37.4%; c 2 (1) = 5.66, p < .05). Participants in the unconscious condition were more likely to choose one of the goal-consistent alternatives (37.4% + 42.9% = 80.3%) as compared with those in the conscious condition (54.9% + 12.1% = 67.0%; c 2 (1) = 4.08, p < .05). Therefore, participants in the conscious condition were more likely to choose a goal-inconsistent alternative (15.4% + 17.6% = 33.0%) than participants in the unconscious condition (12.1% + 7.6% = 19.7%). These results replicate the prior studies.
The second analysis focused on the competing-goalabsent condition. There was an effect of the goal instantiation condition on choice (c 2 (3) = 17.63, p < .01). Participants in the conscious condition (69.0%) remained more likely to choose the most goal-consistent alternative than participants in the unconscious condition (41.2%; c 2 (1) = 13.43, p < .01). However, participants in the unconscious condition were no longer more likely to choose one of the goal-consistent alternatives (41.2% + 38.8% = 80.0%) as compared with the conscious condition (69.0% + 12.6% = 81.6%; c 2 (1) = .07, p > .45). Looked at differently, participants in the conscious condition were no longer more likely to choose a goalinconsistent alternative (8.0% + 10.4% = 18.4%) than participants in the unconscious condition (9.4% + 10.6% = 20.0%). Most importantly, in the conscious condition, participants in the competing-goal-absent condition (69.0%) were more likely to choose the most goal-consistent alternative than participants in the competing-goal-present condition (54.9%; c 2 (1) = 3.70, p < .05). These results suggest that when options associated with a competing goal were not present, participants in the conscious goal condition did not elaborate as much on the other available options.
In support of this conjecture, an analysis of the time taken to make a choice revealed a goal instantiation × competing goal interaction (F(1, 350) = 4.26, p < .05). In the competing-goal-present condition, participants in the conscious condition took longer to make their choice (M = 14.83, SD = 8.28) compared with the unconscious condition (M = 11.86, SD = 6.98; F(1, 350) = 6.96, p < .01). In the competing-goal-absent condition, there was no difference in time taken to choose (M conscious = 13.13, SD = 5.81 vs. M unconscious = 13.49, SD = 8.90; F < 1).
Goal importance. As we expected, an analysis of the focal goal item revealed only a significant effect of goal instantiation (F(1, 350) = 11.75, p < .01). Participants in the conscious condition indicated that fun dining was more important (M = 6.03, SD = 1.88) as compared with participants in the unconscious condition (M = 5.33, SD = 1.99). An analysis of the competing goal item, however, revealed a goal instantiation × competing goal interaction (F(1, 350) = 6.44, p < .01). In the competing-goal-present condition, participants in the conscious condition indicated that fine dining was more important (M = 4.96, SD = 2.12) as compared with participants in the unconscious condition (M = 4.12, SD = 2.15; F(1, 350) = 7.61, p < .01). In the competing-goal-absent condition, however, participants in the conscious condition no longer indicated an increased importance in fine dining (M = 4.33, SD = 2.00) as compared with those in the unconscious condition (M = 4.60, SD = 1.87; F < 1). This suggests that participants in the conscious condition (1) no longer elaborated more on the importance of the competing goal and (2) were not simply giving higher importance ratings to any goal they were asked about. Finally, an analysis of the noncompeting goal item did not yield a significant effect of goal instantiation (M conscious = 4.31, SD = 2.24 vs. M unconscious = 4.51, SD = 2.05; F < 1), competing goal factor, or the interaction of the two (both Fs < 1); this suggests that participants in the conscious condition did not elaborate on the goalinconsistent alternatives when these alternatives did not serve a competing goal.
Discussion
The results indicate that when people pursue a goal consciously, they are more likely to elaborate on a competing goal when there are goal-inconsistent alternatives that serve this goal. When goal-inconsistent alternatives serve a noncompeting goal, the goal associated with these alternatives does not increase in importance. Consequently, conscious choice increases the likelihood of choosing a goal-inconsistent alternative only when competing alternatives are available. These results support our conceptualization that conscious goal pursuit elaborates on each alternative to examine its efficacy with regards to serving the goal. When the alternatives do not serve a competing goal, goal-inconsistent choices are similar across conditions. STUDY 6: MULTIPLE GOALS AND GOAL-CONSISTENT ALTERNATIVES In Study 6, we wanted to provide additional evidence that the unconscious uses a matching process to make a choice. A choice set was created in which one option was superior (inferior) with respect to a focal (competing) goal, a second option was superior (inferior) with respect to a competing (focal) goal, and a third option was acceptable with respect to both goals. Although the conscious should be able to choose the acceptable option on both goals (i.e., multiple goal pursuit) a reasonable number of times, we anticipated that the unconscious would be better able to do so. This should occur because the conscious should engage in elaboration to determine which option is the most consistent with both goals and have a difficult time finding a single best option. Alternatively, the unconscious should have more opportunity to match a specific alternative to the active goals as the number of primed goals increases. This reasoning is consistent with the Kopetz et al.'s (2011) finding that priming multiple goals limits the set of options consumers consider. For example, the authors show that because not all healthy options also aid in performing well at school, students considered fewer means of being healthy when they were simultaneously primed with the goals of being healthy and doing well in school, compared with when they only had the goal of being healthy (Kopetz et al. 2011) .
Method
Participants and design. Participants were 194 members of an online panel (MTurk; 44% female; M age = 33.24 years). This was the final sample after removing 6 participants for failing the attention check. The design was a 2 (number of goals: single, multiple) × 2 (goal instantiation: conscious, unconscious) between-subjects design.
Stimuli. The choice set consisted of trees A, C, and E from Study 2. Tree A (E) was selected because it was rated high (low) on the goal "to have an easy-to-use product" but low (high) on the goal "to have an aesthetically pleasing product." Tree C was ranked moderately on both goals. Therefore, tree C was an acceptable option, but not the best option, given both goals.
Procedure. The procedure was similar to Study 2. In the conscious condition, participants first completed the "Understanding Scientific Research" study, which varied depending on condition. In the single-goal condition, the study was identical to the high-goal-value condition of Study 2, in which participants read an abstract stating that "consumers who were the most satisfied in their product experience placed a great deal of emphasis on having an easy-to-use product." In the multiple-goal condition, the abstract was modified to read that consumers wanted to have "an easy-to-use product that is aesthetically pleasing."
In the unconscious condition, participants first completed the lexical decision task, which varied depending on condition. In the single-goal condition, the study was similar to the high-goal-value condition of Study 2, in which participants received 50 trials in total, 30 of which were nonwords and 20 of which were the priming words.
Ten of these trials contained words pertaining to the easeof-use goal (e.g., "easy," "intuitive") and ten contained the high-goal-value words (e.g., "worthwhile," "good"). In the multiple-goal condition, participants also received 50 total trials, 10 of which were nonwords and 40 of which were the priming words. Of these trials, 10 pertained to the ease-ofuse goal, 10 trials pertained to the aesthetics goal (e.g., beautiful, pretty), and 20 trials contained the high-goalvalue words. For both the conscious and unconscious conditions, the expectation was that the multiple-goal condition would concurrently activate the goals to have an easy-to-use product and an aesthetically pleasing product, whereas the single-goal condition would activate the former-but not the latter-goal.
After completing the study, all participants moved to the same study as discussed in the Study 2, except that the choice set was three bonsai trees. After making a choice, participants were asked to indicate the extent to which they agreed (1 = "strongly disagree," and 9 = "strongly agree") that "the goal to select something that was not too hard to take care of" was important during their choice (ease-of-use goal). Participants were also asked to indicate the extent to which the "only goal I cared about was the look of the tree" while making their choice (aesthetics goal). Participants then answered demographic questions and were extensively debriefed for suspicion.
Results
Choices. The first analysis focused on the single-goal condition. The results are consistent with the prior studies. There was an effect of goal instantiation condition on choices (c 2 (2) = 16.37, p < .01; see Table 1 ). Participants in the conscious goal condition (65.1%) were more likely to choose tree A (best option for the focal goal ease of use) than those in the unconscious condition (45.1%; c 2 (1) = 3.77, p < .05). Participants in the unconscious goal condition were more likely to choose one of the acceptable options (i.e., tree A or C) (45.1% + 43.1% = 88.2%) as compared with those in the conscious condition (65.1% + 7.0% = 72.1%; c 2 (1) = 3.94, p < .05). The same test showed that participants in the conscious condition (27.9%) were more likely to choose tree E (unacceptable on the focal goal ease of use) than those in the unconscious condition (11.8%).
The second analysis focused on the multiple-goal condition. There was an effect of goal instantiation condition on choices (c 2 (2) = 10.30, p < .01; see Table 1 ). Participants in the unconscious condition (71.7%) were more likely to choose tree C (acceptable on both goals) than participants in the conscious condition (40.7%; c 2 (1) = 9.64, p < .01). An additional test showed that moving from single to multiple goal pursuit increased the share of tree C (acceptable on both goals) in the unconscious (P single = 43.1%, P multiple = 71.7%; c 2 (1) = 8.06, p < .01) and conscious (P single = 7.0%, P multiple = 40.7%; c 2 (1) = 14.27, p < .01) conditions. Goal importance. We anticipated that the goal to have an easy-to-use product would be more important to participants in the conscious (vs. unconscious) goal condition. However, for the goal to have an aesthetically pleasing product, we predicted that participants in the conscious, multiple-goal condition would rate this goal as more important than participants in the conscious, single-goal condition. An analysis of the goal to have an easy-touse product revealed a main effect of goal instantiation (F(1, 190) = 10.69, p < .01). Participants in the conscious condition indicated that selecting an easy-to-use product was more important (M = 7.06, SD = 2.26) compared with participants in the unconscious condition (M = 5.93, SD = 2.58). An analysis of the goal to have an aesthetically pleasing product revealed a main effect of goal instantiation (F(1, 190) = 21.52, p < .01) as well as a significant interaction between number of goals and goal instantiation (F(1, 190) = 4.18, p < .05). In the conscious goal condition, participants in the multiple-goal condition indicated that selecting an aesthetically pleasing product was more important (M = 6.61, SD = 2.01) compared with participants in the single-goal condition (M = 5.58, SD = 2.61; F(1, 190) = 5.07, p < .05). In the unconscious goal condition, participants did not show an increased importance of an aesthetically pleasing product as the choice context went from the single-(M = 4.75, SD = 2.16) to the multiple-goal condition (M = 4.46, SD = 2.19; F < 1).
Discussion
The results indicate that multiple-goal pursuit enables the unconscious to isolate an alternative that is acceptable given both goals. These results are important because they show that the unconscious can outperform the conscious in more complex goal pursuit environments. The unconscious was more likely to choose the option that was acceptable on both goals, even though the conscious had the opportunity to reason about the attractiveness of the acceptable option. For some participants, the conscious could not reject an option that was poor on one of the goals. Thus, the results provide insight into when the unconscious is able to make a good decision (Dijksterhuis and Nordgren 2006) .
GENERAL DISCUSSION
There have been numerous demonstrations of unconscious goal pursuit (Bargh et al. 2001; Chartrand and Bargh 1996; Chartrand et al. 2008; Sela and Shiv 2009) , including research proposing that the unconscious goal system is smart and capable of performing well in an array of situations (Eitam, Hassin, and Schul 2008) . Research has also demonstrated that unconscious thinking may be more helpful than conscious thinking in generating higher attitude consistency (Nordgren and Dijksterhuis 2009 ). Yet there have also been arguments against these claims (Payne et al. 2008) . The current research examined contexts in which each type of goal pursuit chooses (1) the most goalconsistent alternative, (2) goal-consistent alternatives in general, and (3) goal-inconsistent alternatives.
The results show that, compared with unconscious goal pursuit, conscious goal pursuit increases the likelihood of choosing the most goal-consistent alternative as well as the likelihood of choosing an alternative that is consistent with a competing goal (Studies 1, 2, 3, 5, and 6). Conscious goal pursuit is often characterized by a desire to find the most goal-consistent alternative, whereas unconscious goal pursuit is often characterized by finding an alternative that is acceptable, given the goal. Consequently, conscious goal pursuit becomes more effective when there are no options that support an important competing goal (Study 5). Unconscious goal pursuit is influenced by the addition of more attributes that are consistent with the active goal (Study 4) and can become more discriminating as the number of concurrently pursued goals increases (Study 6).
We investigated conscious and unconscious goal pursuit using procedures that were less taxing than the procedures used in prior studies (Strick et al. 2011) . Participants made less complex decisions (with fewer alternatives and fewer pieces of information) than were made in previous research. In addition, the decisions in our experiments were stimulus based with a self-determined amount of contemplation. Given that the modified procedure is different from that used in previous research (e.g., Dijksterhuis 2004) , an important question is whether the procedure we used closely resembles typical decision-making contexts. We contend that many decision contexts involve (1) a salient decision criterion (i.e., goals) (2) that people are more or less aware of (conscious vs. unconscious decision making), as well as (3) a presentation of alternatives that people can examine for as little or as long as they want. Moreover, decades of research on conscious decision making and unconscious goal priming have used similar procedures. Therefore, it is important to note the insights from our procedure because it is representative of many decisions. Of course, there are many situations in which people hold tens of pieces of information in memory and think about them (or are distracted) for a specified amount of time before making a decision, to which these results would not generalize.
Our conceptualization and findings also inform the ongoing discussion on the "smart unconscious" (Dijksterhuis and Nordgren 2006; Eitam, Hassin, and Schul 2008) . The unconscious goal system does seem to be smart. It is capable of finding alternatives associated with a goal, inhibiting the selection of alternatives that are not associated with the goal, and quickly making a decision that supports goal pursuit. It also faces challenges because it is not efficient in differentiating alternatives of generally high utility given the goal. The conscious system is also smart. It is capable of finding the alternatives with the highest utility given the goal and using deliberation to improve the quality of most decisions. It also faces challenges, as when deliberation leads to a choice that is subsequently regretted. Therefore, it does not seem feasible to find an absolute answer on which one of these two thought systems is better. We believe that both contribute in an adaptive way to people's decision making and well-being, which suggests that future studies should examine the interactions between these two types of goal pursuit. For example, many goals are unconsciously pursued because their execution has become automatic over time (i.e., the conscious system has ceded control to the unconscious system). Sometimes, however, the unconscious system cedes control to the conscious system. Several situations exemplify this scenario, such as when a person does not consciously process the environment until a relevant stimulus (e.g., a friendly face) appears, when focused attention processes are initiated as a response to danger (e.g., presence of a dangerous animal), or when a goal suddenly becomes more important (e.g., attending to a child in need). In all of these examples, the unconscious system was processing the environment in an efficient, resource-conserving way but ceded control to conscious thought when additional processing was beneficial.
The findings have implications for understanding the effectiveness of self-regulatory strategies. If we define selfregulation narrowly as "one's ability to choose the best alternatives to pursue an active goal," then conscious goal pursuit may be more effective than unconscious goal pursuit. Conscious goal pursuit uses elaboration to identify means that are likely to have the highest utility given the goal (Van Osselaer and Janiszewski 2012). This elaboration can increase the likelihood that the best, most goalconsistent alternative will be chosen. If we define selfregulation broadly as one's ability to pursue active goals (Bargh et al. 2001) , then unconscious goal pursuit may be more effective than conscious goal pursuit. Unconscious goal pursuit chooses an array of acceptable alternatives, which increases the likelihood of successful goal pursuit. This may be especially beneficial when one has to use seemingly suboptimal alternatives in adaptive ways (i.e., creative problem solving). Of course, recommendations to use one type of goal pursuit or the other must be moderated by the degree of necessity associated with pursuing the goal. It may be the case that chronic, pressing goals are best pursued unconsciously but temporary, intermittent goals are best pursued consciously.
The results also have implications for how marketing actions influence consumers' choices. Consider a retailer's attempt to influence purchase behavior. The extent to which the retailer will benefit from explicitly suggesting goals (e.g., a salesperson offering guidance) may be sensitive to marketing decisions that affect the structure of the product assortment. For example, if the retailer has a small product assortment featuring a premium brand sold at a higher profit margin, then instantiating a conscious goal may be most effective in terms of profitability. By the same logic, implicit strategies (e.g., information in the environment priming a goal) should be more effective when retailers stock larger assortments that can result in multiple purchases. Unconscious decisions should encourage the consumer to conclude that multiple goal-consistent product alternatives are acceptable, thus increasing the likelihood of a multi-item sale. This recommendation would be especially beneficial when the retailer sells several alternatives at a similar profit margin rather than one premium alternative and several inferior ones. Although these recommendations focus on assortment size and breadth of positioning, any marketing decision (e.g., promotion, distribution) that controls shopping goals could have similar results.
Conclusion
This research is an initial effort to understand conscious and unconscious goal pursuit. Still, more needs to be done to understand the ways in which consciousness and unconsciousness direct goal pursuit and choice. We hope to motivate further research that will both (1) investigate the phenomena examined here using an even broader array of goals and goal activation procedures and (2) direct attention to alternative aspects of goals that might be influenced by the degree of (un)conscious thought put into the goal pursuit process. Figure B1 STUDY 2 CHOICE STIMULI
